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The International Responsibility of the European 
Union—The EU Perspective: Between Pragmatism 
and Proceduralisation  
Andrés Delgado Casteleiro

 
Abstract 
EU management of its international responsibility for wrongful acts varies between a pragmatic approach and 
the proceduralisation of its responsibility. The EU either lays down complex procedures in order to manage 
the allocation of responsibility in order to (allegedly) preserve the internal division of competences or takes a 
pragmatic approach which disregards any internal division of competences. This chapter critically analyses 
these two trends in EU practice. More precisely, it identifies from the ongoing development in the incipient 
foreign direct investment policy of the EU and in its accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
the problems linked to this way of managing the EU’s international responsibility. Overall, it argues that 
instead of complex and slow procedures or ad hoc pragmatic solutions, the EU should adhere to a rule-based 
approach which is at the same time pragmatic and respects the principles underpinning the proceduralisation 
of responsibility.  
I. Introduction 
The EU’s participation in international agreements is a complex and fascinating issue which has 
attracted plenty of scholarly attention in recent years. Issues including the way in which the EU 
and its Member States negotiate, conclude and ratify international agreements,
1
 or the 
                                                 

 The author would like to thank Markus Gehring and Robert Schuetze for their useful comments and suggestions. 
The usual disclaimer applies.  
1
 See, for instance, A Dashwood, ‘Mixity in the Era of the Lisbon Treaty’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed 
Agreements Revisited. The EU and its Member States in the World (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010); C-D 
Ehlermann, ‘Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems’ in D O’Keeffe and HG Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements 
(Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1983); F Hoffmeister, ‘Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent 
Practice of the European Community and its Member States’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements 
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Interuniversitaires Européennes, 1997); PJ Kuijper, Of ‘Mixity’ and ‘Double-Hatting’: EU External Relations Law 
relationship between the EU and international law have been thoroughly discussed in the EU 
external relations law literature.
2
 By contrast, discussions on the international responsibility of 
the EU, ie, the legal consequences following the breach of an international agreement by the EU, 
have not traditionally attracted the same level of interest. However, as a consequence of the 
surge in cases in which the attribution of responsibility to the EU played a rather important role 
in recent years
3
 and the publication of the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (ARIO) by the International Law Commission,
4
 the responsibility of the EU under 
international law has begun to draw some attention. In this regard, the discussion on the 
responsibility of the EU has been approached from many different angles. For instance, how do 
the international rules on responsibility apply to the EU?
5
 How has the EU influenced the 
international rules on responsibility of international organisations?
6
 Or how is the EU responsible 
in practice?
7
 This chapter examines a different issue concerning the responsibility of the EU in 
international law: how does the EU manage its international responsibility in its treaty-making 
practice? In this regard, EU international responsibility poses very interesting questions. The 
complex division competences summed up with the multi-level system of implementation of EU 
law create legal uncertainty for third parties as to the liable subject of an internally wrongful act.
8
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 F Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating against the European Union and its Member States: Who Responds under the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International Organizations?’ (2010) 21 European Journal of 
International Law 723; M Björklund, ‘Responsibility in the EC for Mixed Agreements’ [2001] Nordic Journal Of 
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Should the EU or its Member States be held liable for those actions committed by a Member 
State when implementing EU law? Furthermore, the vertical division of competences gives rise 
to plenty of disagreement, especially on issues of international responsibility.
9
 In other words, 
should the way in which the EU bears responsibility entail any kind of consequence as regards 
the division of competence? 
As a response to these concerns, the EU, when concluding international agreements, 
negotiates the inclusion of different techniques dealing with these questions. These techniques 
range from pragmatic solutions like denying the existence of any potential issue regarding the 
EU’s responsibility to setting up procedures to follow whenever there is a responsibility claim. 
Whereas these different approaches could prima facie solve the problems posed by the EU’s 
international responsibility through managerial techniques,
10
 this chapter shows how these 
techniques do not completely solve the problems posed by the EU’s violation of its international 
obligations. On the contrary, it shows how these techniques can add more uncertainty and 
exacerbate the inter-institutional discussions over the division of competences. The chapter is 
structured into three sections. Section II identifies the different interests which guide the different 
techniques used by the EU when dealing with its international responsibility. Section III focuses 
on how these interests have been taken into account in procedures dealing with the EU’s 
international responsibility. Section IV provides some conclusions as to the direction to which 
these mediating strategies should move forward. 
II. The Guiding Principles of the EU’s International Responsibility  
The international responsibility of the EU can be seen as the conjunction of different interests. 
First, there is the non-EU party to the international agreement which when faced with a breach 
on the EU side demands reparations. Moreover,
11
 third parties might fear that the EU and its 
Member States could hide behind each other, avoiding their responsibilities.
12
 In other words, 
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12
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third parties might be concerned that the EU’s participation in international agreement could lead 
to a gap in its responsibility. Second, the EU when acting externally might want to assert its 
autonomy from its Member States, both at the institutional level (ie, the EU is a distinct legal 
subject with its own separate legal personality) and at the competence level (ie, the EU is an 
autonomous legal order separate from both international and national law). Furthermore, this 
autonomy would also entail a certain degree of respect or cooperation from the Member States 
towards the EU.
13
 Third, EU Member States might want to preserve their autonomy from 
incursion by the EU. This is reflected in their narrow reading of the division of competences with 
the EU.
14
 Since the autonomy of EU law entails its supremacy over Member States legislation in 
those areas in which there is a transfer of powers, Member States can only safeguard their 
autonomy in those areas not transferred to the EU. Consequently, EU Member States have a 
clear interest in upholding a strict reading of the division of competences. This section examines 
how the EU’s treaty-making practice deals with these divergent interests. It is divided into two 
parts. The first identifies the different principles which guide the EU’s treaty-making practice 
and international responsibility, while the second conceptualises the different techniques used by 
the EU to reconcile these organising principles.  
A. Diverging Interests as Principles of EU International Responsibility  
In the EU’s treaty-making practice, we can identify at least three different principles: legal 
certainty, the vertical division of powers and the duty of cooperation. The Commission has 
explicitly mentioned these three interests as the organising principles guiding the EU´s action in 
the field of investment.
15
 More precisely, these principles need to be taken into account when 
managing the consequences of a responsibility claim.
16
 They are also mentioned in the draft of 
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 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
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16
 ibid. Furthermore, the Commission also mentions a new organising principle in the area of international 
investment: budget neutrality. However, it is not completely clear how this principle would operate in this area of 
international law, and whether it can and should be extended to other instances of the EU’s treaty-making practice. 
the EU’s accession to the ECHR and explain the need for a special procedure to deal with the 
EU’s responsibility under this agreement.17  
i. The Vertical Division of Competences 
The division of competences is undoubtedly one the main principles guiding the EU’s treaty-
making practice. The inherent tension between attributed and implied powers has a marked 
influence on the EU’s treaty-making power and responsibility.18 The different perspectives on 
the division of powers resemble the principal-agent dilemma. On the one hand, the Member 
States have delegated some functions to the EU to achieve certain objectives.
19
 On the other 
hand, Member States fear that the EU might not act in accordance with its conferred functions 
and objectives. In other words, EU Member States are reluctant to accept wide treaty-making 
powers to the EU given the moral hazard and the conflict of interests that this could entail. As a 
consequence of this tension, for instance, the Council during the 1980s clearly rejected the 
doctrine of parallelism as established by the Court of Justice.
20
 More recently, in a similar vein, 
the UK decided to veto more than 70 EU statements to UN committees, insisting that these 
statements should be delivered on behalf of the ‘EU and its Member States’ rather than simply 
on behalf of the EU.
21
 The Council in the 1980s and the UK in recent times show the unease 
underpinning the transfer of power to the EU. The Member States do not completely trust the EU 
as regards the powers delegated to it.  
Consequently, the EU in its treaty-making practice will try to balance between its own 
interests and power and the Member States’ reluctance to allow the EU to act with complete 
autonomy. In this respect, the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements enshrined 
                                                 
17
 Draft Explanatory Report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The last version can be found in Steering Committee for 
Human Rights (CDDH), ‘Report to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal instruments for the 
accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights’, CDDH (2011) 009, parad 32–33. 
18
 J Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
64.  
19
 On functionalism and the EU, see J Klabbers, ‘Contending Approaches to International Organizations: Between 
Functionalism and Constitutionalism’ in J Klabbers and A Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of 
International Organizations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011). 
20
 D McGoldrick, International Relations of the European Union (London, Longman, 1997) 99; M Cremona, ‘The 
Doctrine of Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements in the External Relations of the European 
Community’ [1982] OJLS 411. 
21
 See J Borger, ‘EU Anger over British Stance on UN Statements’ The Guardian (London, 20 October 2011). 
Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/uk-eu-un-statements-wording. 
in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) shows the tension 
between the different interests as regards the division of competences. Even though Article 216 
TFEU identifies the scenarios in which the Member States have transferred their treaty-making 
powers to the EU, Article 218 TFEU is designed in such a way that EU Member States continue 
to play a very relevant role in the decision-making process, regardless of the EU´s competence. 
The Council not only authorises the opening of negotiations, it also address directives to the 
negotiator, authorises the signing of agreements and concludes them.  
The conflict between the interests also arises when the exclusive nature of the conferred 
power is undisputed. Two examples can be given in this regard: first, the PROBA 20 
arrangement
22
 is a clear illustration of how the diverging interests of the EU and its Member 
States also take place in those situations in which the conferral is complete, ie, exclusive 
competence on trade and commodity agreements.
23
 The PROBA 20 arrangement established that 
the Member States would participate in the international negotiations concerning raw materials 
leaving aside any legal or institutional consideration with regard to the respective powers of the 
EU and the Member States. The second example will be analysed in further detail in section III. 
At this stage, it is enough to say that foreign direct investment (FDI) is another of those instances 
in which the question of the division of competences appears to have been settled. Article 207 
TFEU grants the EU exclusive competence on FDI,
24
 but the EU nevertheless has currently 
presented a proposal dealing with Member States’ participation on FDI disputes.25 
As it has been shown in this section, the diverging interests regarding the division of 
competences run deeper within the EU’s treaty-making practice than it might appear at first 
sight. Therefore, it seems logical that when speaking about the responsibility of the EU under 
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 European Commission (n 14) 2. 
international law, the division of competences and the tension between the EU and its Member 
States will play a pivotal role.
26
  
ii. Legal Certainty 
In the past, third states have had certain concerns regarding the EU’s participation in 
international agreements.
27
 These concerns stem from the nature of the EU as a legal subject.
28
 
Third states might have problems in accepting that the EU has assumed certain functions that 
previously belonged to sovereign states. In other words, they are suspicious of the EU’s 
functional nature and the extent to which the EU Member States might avoid their 
responsibilities or take advantage of the special status of the EU.
29
 In other words, third states 
have an interest in a clear rule over the diverging interests of the EU and its Member States.  
However, in certain situations the EU and its Member States might prefer to leave certain 
legal questions unresolved when concluding an international agreement. For instance, the 
PROBA 20 arrangement clearly stated that the joint participation of the EU and its Member 
States in an international agreement was irrespective of any legal or institutional consideration 
with regard to the respective powers of the EU and the Member States.
30
 The lack of agreement 
between the EU and its Member States as to the division of competences in a specific area can 
create legal uncertainty in relation to the other subjects. Therefore, third parties might be 
confused as to who is competent and responsible for a specific mattered covered by the 
agreement, and demand some sort of ex ante explanation as to when the EU is going to speak, 
vote and implement within that agreement. For instance, last year’s UN GA Resolution on the 
participation of the EU aims at giving legal certainty to third states on when it is going to be the 
EU and when it is going to be its Member States to participate in the work of the UN bodies.
31
  
iii. The Duty of Cooperation 
                                                 
26
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Indiana Journal of Global Studies 535. 
27
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de la Académie du Droit International218; Cremona, (n 20), 411; cf Ehlermann (n 1). 
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31
 Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations. UNGA Res 65/276.  
At first, the duty of cooperation did not appear to be an organising principle of EU external 
relations. Instead, it was a tool used to deal with the complexities of the division of powers in the 
external sphere. The ECJ clearly recognised that fact in Ruling 1/78
32
 when it made reference to 
the duty of cooperation as a way to manage the mixed participation of the EU and its Member 
States in the Nuclear Materials Convention. Since a duty in principle does not entail a legal 
obligation,
33
 Article 4(3) TEU was used as a way to ensure that the division of powers did not 
affect the legal certainty of third parties, while at the same time leaving the questions on the 
exact delimitation of competence unanswered.  
In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement on Opinion 1/94 provided a very clear 
illustration on how the duty of cooperation mediated between the different interests of the EU 
and its Member States as regards the division of competences. The Court identified that: 
[I]nterminable discussions will ensue to determine whether a given matter falls within the 
competence of the Community, so that the Community mechanisms laid down by the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty will apply, or whether it is within the competence of the Member States, 
in which case the consensus rule will operate. The Community's unity of action vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world will thus be undermined and its negotiating power greatly weakened.
34
 
In this paragraph the Court clearly highlighted how the diverging interests in the division of 
powers can negatively affect the legal certainty of third parties and consequently also negatively 
affect other interests at stake in the WTO agreement. Therefore, the Court proposed that in 
situations such as the one at stake:  
[I]t is essential to ensure close co-operation between the Member States and the Community 
institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the 
commitments entered into. That obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community.
35
  
Therefore, in order to balance between the different interests in the WTO agreement, the Court 
establishes the duty to cooperate between the EU and its Member States so that the division of 
competences does not become an issue. Moreover, according to the Court, that cooperation must 
ensure the unity of external representation, meaning that it is not only in the interests of the EU 
                                                 
32
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33
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34
 Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning Services and the 
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but also in the interests of the legal certainty of third parties that the EU does not send incoherent 
messages.  
  By recognising a duty to cooperate and not a legal obligation solving the diverging 
interest, the Court understood that Article 4(3) could serve as a managerial device.
36
 By not 
creating a specific legal obligation on either the EU or its Member States, the duty allows any 
result of that cooperation to be contextualized. The outcome of such cooperation will not bind 
any of the parties cooperating in future arrangements.  
However, in recent years the duty has started to evolve to become an organising 
principle, an interest on its own. The Court recognised that the duty of cooperation, in its unity of 
external representation principle facet,
37
 was one of the interests to take int account when laying 
down procedural strategies in international agreements. In the Food and Aliments Organisation 
(FAO) judgment, the Court recognised that the: ‘Arrangement between the Council and the 
Commission represents fulfilment of that duty of cooperation … It is clear, moreover, from the 
terms of the Arrangement, that the two institutions intended to enter into a binding commitment 
towards each other.’38  
 Recent cases like PFOS,
39
 IMO
40
 or Inland Waterways
41
 seem to point towards this new 
understanding of the duty of cooperation as an organising principle of EU external relations. The 
Court now sees the duty of cooperation not as a way to allow the different perspectives on the 
division of competences to coexist within the framework of an agreement, but as a legal duty of 
abstention imposed on the Member States.
42
 In other words, the duty of cooperation is no longer 
a managerial device aimed at ensuring that the interests of both the EU and its Member States are 
duly taken into account in the framework of an international agreement. Instead, the duty of 
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 A Delgado Casteleiro and J Larik, ‘The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External Relations?’ 
(2011) 36 European Law Review 524. 
cooperation works as another way of preserving the EU’s autonomy and power. Regardless of 
the competence involved, the duty of cooperation imposes limits on EU Member States’ room 
for manoeuvre in the international scene. This principle becomes especially important when 
dealing with the participation of the EU and its Member States in international disputes. By 
virtue of the duty of cooperation, Member States cannot bring claims to international courts 
without previously informing the EU,
43
 and when acting as respondents in many instances must 
follow the EU’s position.44 
B. Organising EU International Responsibility: Pragmatism and Procedures 
The different and competing interests at stake when negotiating an international agreement with 
the EU create a conundrum that is not easily solvable. The different actors involved have 
different and often contradictory interests, for instance, the EU and its Member States have 
different views on the exact division of competences in external relations. Logically, any 
negotiation would involve giving preference to some interests over others. However, the 
different negotiators might not be willing to compromise on certain interests or principles. To 
reconcile these different diverging interests in an international agreement, the parties might 
include different legal techniques which mediate between these diverging interests.
45
 However, 
these techniques would not provide a solution on how to balance those interests. Instead, they 
provide a simulacrum of consensus at the level of abstract principles or interests.
46
 The strategy 
apparently makes the diverging interests or principles converge, either by creating a legal 
vacuum in which the principles seem to meet or by postponing the decision on how the diverging 
principles come together. Consequently, the problems linked with these diverging interests will 
usually surface in the implementation or responsibility stage of the life-cycle of the agreement. 
These organising techniques can range from pragmatic solutions, which disregard the different 
interests altogether, to procedures in which the parties can discuss how the different principles 
will apply to a specific situation.  
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i  Mixed Agreements as a Pragmatic Solution to the Discussions on the Division of Competences 
and Legal Certainty  
In the EU’s treaty-making practice, these organising techniques have become common features, 
mixed agreements being the most obvious example. Mixed agreements are international 
agreements to which both the EU and its Member States are parties.
47
 By concluding the 
agreement jointly, the EU and its Member States set aside the question on the division of 
competences.
48
 While it is clear that the EU had competence to conclude the agreement, the 
extent to which the EU has exercised its competences on that agreement is left unanswered. In 
other words, the discussion on the division of competences is abandoned so as to conclude the 
agreement. Hence, mixed agreements seem to alleviate many of the problems concerning the 
EU’s treaty-making practice from a pragmatic standpoint.49 By leaving all the difficult questions 
floating in a legal vacuum, mixity postpones any problem to the implementation and 
responsibility stages. As Tomuschat noted: ‘Mixed agreements create no great difficulties as 
long as their implementation proceeds smoothly.’50 As an organising technique, mixed 
agreements suggest the existence of a consensus on the different opposing interests in the EU’s 
treaty-making practice. It is assumed that all of the parties have reached an agreement regarding 
their different interests on the division of competences between the EU and its Member States, 
and that the legal certainty of the non-EU party to the agreement is not negatively affected by 
this division. Since the agreement was concluded, a consensus on the different principles is 
implied. However, when faced with a breach of this agreement, those opposing interests surface, 
questioning the effectiveness of mixed agreements. 
 An interesting example on how mixity leaves these diverging interests in a legal vacuum 
is the Palermo Convention against transnational organised crime
51
(Palermo Convention) and the 
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negotiations that led to its conclusion. The diverging interests previously identified were present 
throughout the negotiations. On the one hand, the issue of the EU’s powers in relation to the 
subject matter covered by the agreement was not settled before the negotiations started. Initially, 
the Commission had an observer status in the negotiations while the EU’s Member States were 
negotiating. In addition, the Council adopted a Joint Position exhorting the Member States ‘to 
ensure that the provisions of the draft convention relating to the obligation to criminalise 
particular activities are consistent in particular with Articles 1 and 2 of Joint Action 98/733/JHA’ 
and to avoid any ‘incompatibility between the proposed convention and instruments drawn up in 
the Union’.52 This Joint Position show how the EU Member States (seated in the Council) 
considered that the division of competences between the EU and its Member States in relation to 
this issue allowed them to negotiate on their own behalf. However, they eventually accepted that 
the European Commission should be involved in a different capacity than as an observer and 
authorised it to negotiate.
53
 This shows the existing tension between the EU and its Member 
States as regards their participation in international negotiations. It could be argued that since the 
moment that the EU Member States accepted that the Commission should negotiate the 
agreement, they had reached and settled the discussion. However, the fact that the Member 
States accepted that there was some competences involved that required the participation of the 
EU (the EC at that time) does not mean that different interests have coalesced. This can clearly 
be seen in the statements made by the government of Portugal in the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The representative of 
Portugal, speaking on behalf of the EU Member States, informed the Ad Hoc Committee that 
‘the representative of the European Commission had been mandated by the Council of the 
European Union to negotiate certain articles’.54 Therefore, the tension between the EU and its 
Member States remained, regardless of the mandate to the Commission to negotiate the 
agreement. The statement did not acknowledge the transfer of powers to the EU in the subject 
matter covered by the agreement. The Member States recognised that the Council (ie, the 
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Member States) had authorised the Commission to negotiate certain provisions. However, this 
does mean that a transfer of powers to the EU has occurred. There are many instances in which 
the EU negotiates on behalf of the Member States, even though it does not have the competence 
to do so. For instance, within the WTO before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, all 
Member States recognised that the EU should speak with one voice and that the Commission 
should be the sole negotiator and spokesperson on issues of shared competence like services.
55
 
Therefore, Member States might continue to retain the competence over this subject matter, 
regardless of who is negotiating. 
The other negotiating parties saw these diverging views as creating legal uncertainty as to 
whether the EU and/or its Member States would be able to live up to its obligations under the 
agreement.
56
 Consequently, the EU, its Member States and the third parties agreed to the mixed 
nature of the Palermo Convention. However, the mixed formula did not solve any of the issues 
raised by the negotiations. The Commission continued to claim to have competence, whilst the 
EU Member States did as well, and the third parties continued to regard the participation of the 
EU and its Member States as creating legal uncertainty. Mixity created a legal vacuum in which 
all the different concerns seemed to be taken care of, even though the diverging interest 
continued to exist and might resurface at the responsibility stage. In other words, the mixed 
formula takes the pragmatic solution of ignoring the diverging interests by establishing a 
framework in which all of them seem to have been taken care of. 
ii. The Proceduralisation of the EU’s Responsibility 
Similarly, procedural solutions also seem to alleviate the conflict between the different diverging 
interests. As Koskenniemi rightly notes, ‘proceduralisation … is a useful means to avoid arguing 
about binding obligations in a way that might seem to overrule one sovereign will with 
another’.57 The international agreement enshrines a procedural framework to deal with any doubt 
regarding the compliance of the EU and its Member States. The procedure thus deals with the 
diverging interests in two ways. First, it postpones the decision on how to deal with those 
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interests. According to Kennedy, proceduralisation in more general terms ‘means retreat from the 
attempt to develop rules of proper conduct … The question is not “who can do what”, but 
“according to what procedures will the parties negotiate the division of the relevant pie”?’.58 The 
procedural framework does not provide an ‘ex ante’ rules: it lays down a framework to reach a 
decision. Second, it contextualises the decision by narrowing down its effects. Since the 
procedural framework is only triggered in cases of a clear disagreement at the implementation 
stage, the decision will usually only solve the conflict between diverging interests on that 
particular issue. It will be an ad hoc solution which would rarely be applied to the bigger conflict 
between diverging interests.
59
 In addition, the ad hoc nature of the solution entails a greater 
difficulty (if not impossibility) of advancing normative claims based on those solutions. To what 
extent would the EU be bound to follow previous ad hoc decisions? Furthermore, given that the 
behaviour of international actors can create international law, would different ad hoc solutions 
based on similar procedures meet the standard of virtual uniformity as to constitute custom?
60
  
Proceduralisation is one of the most common features of the EU’s treaty-making practice. 
Whenever there is some kind of disagreement between the diverging interests underpinning an 
international agreement, the EU and the other parties to the agreement tend to favour the 
inclusion of a procedural framework. The agreement defers the solution of the conflict between 
the diverging interests into procedures and future decision making.
61
 The functioning of human 
rights clauses is a good example in this respect. Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement
62
 provides 
a procedure for the suspension of the agreement. The design of the procedure includes 
mechanisms of consultation and dialogue which allow the balancing of the EU’s interests in 
human rights compliance and the other parties’ interests on sovereignty and freedom to deal with 
its internal affairs. In a situation in which prima facie an essential element of the agreement has 
been violated, the different parties must try to reach an agreement through consultations, even in 
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cases of ‘special urgency’.63 Therefore, in terms of responsibility, the breach of human rights 
obligation may or may not entail a breach of the Cotonou Agreement (even if it is one of its 
essential elements) depending on the outcome of the consultations. Moreover, it would also be 
difficult to extract general conclusions of the practice since the outcome will always depend on 
negotiations and not the application of rules. In other words, similar violations might entail 
different responsibilities.  
These different techniques ranging from pragmatic legal vacuums to the inclusion of 
procedures are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, pragmatic solutions do not exclude procedural 
strategies and vice versa. Many mixed agreements (the paradigm of pragmatic solutions in the 
EU’s treaty-making practice)64 envisage procedures designed to deal with these diverging 
interests. Returning to the example of the Palermo Convention, whereas the mixed nature of the 
agreement made it possible to postpone any conflict regarding the EU’s powers, the claims for 
legal certainty were not dealt with satisfactorily. Third parties demanded further assurances.
65
 
Thus, in addition to the joint participation of the EU and its Member States with regard to the 
Convention, third parties also demanded a procedure aiming at dealing with any issue regarding 
the EU’s power which might arise during the implementation of the agreement.66 This feature 
has become more and more relevant in recent years as  the complexity of the procedures gives a 
certain degree of flexibility to the EU and its Member States to reach a decision.
67
 
III. The Management of Responsibility in EU International 
Responsibility: Some Recent Developments 
Moving to the EU’s management of its international responsibility in practice, this section 
focuses on recent trends. As has been argued, the EU’s organising techniques can be an 
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amalgamation of pragmatic and procedural strategies. As shown above, many mixed agreements 
include proceduralisation mechanisms designed to deal with the responsibility of the EU and its 
Member States. This is also the case in the most recent examples. These arrangements  not only 
provide a procedure designed to deal with the different diverging interests but also provide 
simple pragmatic solutions which apply when the outcome of the procedure could be too 
cumbersome for any of the parties. This section first analyses how the Commission proposal on 
financial responsibility in international investment law takes care of the different interests. It then 
moves on to examine how the responsibility of the EU and its Member States will be managed 
once the former accedes to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and cases 
against the EU or its Member States arising out of incompatibilities between EU law and the 
ECHR start to reach the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These two mediating 
strategies show a high degree of sophistication when dealing with the different interests. 
A. Responsibility in International Investment Law: Financial Responsibility and 
Exclusive Competence 
As mentioned above, FDI became an exclusive competence of the EU with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty.
68
 As a result of the exclusive nature of the investment competence, since 
2010 the Commission has been designing a comprehensive policy in this regard. Moreover, it has 
also been preparing the legal instruments which will develop the new European international 
investment policy.
69
  
Within this new policy, the Commission had to address the issue of international 
responsibility. The issue of the EU’s responsibility had become a relevant topic since the current 
arrangements had been proven not to deal with the different interests in an effective way. For 
instance, the transparency declaration annexed to the Energy Charter Treaty provided that:  
The Communities and the Member States will, if necessary, determine among them who is the 
respondent party to arbitration proceedings initiated by an Investor of another Contracting Party. 
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In such [a] case, upon the request of the Investor, the Communities and the Member States 
concerned will make such determination within a period of 30 days.
70
 
However, this declaration did not stop third parties from bringing cases against EU Member 
States over issues of EU law.
71
  
Against this backdrop, the Commission in its policy document mentioned the issue of the 
EU’s responsibility. It stressed that the ‘issue of the international responsibility between the EU 
and the Member States in EU investment agreements needs to be addressed’.72 However, the 
proposal remained silent as to the attribution of wrongful acts or any specific rules which could 
apply to the EU and/or its Member States. Instead, it addressed the issue through the EU’s 
participation in future investment disputes. According to the Commission Communication, 
‘Given the exclusive external competence, [the EU] will also be the sole defendant regarding any 
measure taken by a Member State which affects investments by third country nationals or 
companies falling within the scope of the agreement concerned’73 and it pointed out that further 
rules on responsibility would be tackled in future legislation. Overall, the Commission’s 
Communication shows how the issue of responsibility is not going to be approached from a rule-
based perspective. Instead, the Commission will propose a procedural framework which would 
allow it to express its views on how the responsibility should be attributed in a specific case.  
The Commission’s proposal for a regulation to manage financial responsibility linked to 
investor-state dispute settlement tribunals
74
 lays down the legal framework in which a solution to 
the question of responsibility in investment agreements can be agreed. The explanatory 
memorandum rightly differentiates between the procedures aiming at allowing the EU to 
participate in an investment dispute from the issue of the allocation of financial responsibility. In 
other words, the proposed regulation aims to cover the different stages of an investment dispute 
from the initiation of the proceedings to the payment of the eventual compensation that the 
arbitrators might establish. The proposal understands that:  
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[W]here the treatment of which an investor complained originates in the institutions of the Union 
(including where the measure in question was adopted by a Member State as required by Union 
law), financial responsibility should be borne by the Union. 
Therefore, given the exclusive nature of the investment competence, the explanatory 
memorandum seems to favour the EU’s sole responsibility in this area. In other words, the 
Commission in the explanatory memorandum tries to make the different interests coalesce (the 
autonomy of the EU, the autonomy of it Member States and the legal certainty of third parties) 
by establishing the EU’s sole responsibility whenever it excercises its competence. Article 3 of 
the proposal takes up this idea. Article 3(1) reads as follows: 
1. Financial responsibility arising from a dispute under an agreement shall be apportioned 
according to the following criteria: 
(a) the Union shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment afforded by the 
institutions, bodies or agencies of the Union; 
(b) the Member State concerned shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment 
afforded by that Member State, except where such treatment was required by the law of the 
Union. 
Notwithstanding point (b) of the first subparagraph, where the Member State concerned is 
required to act pursuant to the law of the Union in order to remedy the inconsistency with the law 
of the Union of a prior act, that Member State shall be financially responsible unless the adoption 
of such prior act was required by the law of the Union. 
The provision mandates financial responsibility in the framework of investment arbitration. 
Whenever an EU organ commits a wrongful act, it is for the EU to bear responsibility. Likewise, 
breaches committed by organs of EU Member States should be attributed to the Member States, 
unless they were acting under the EU’s normative control. Given the exclusive nature of FDI, 
these rules of attribution respond to the fact that EU Member States would not be allowed to act 
in the field of FDI unless the EU empowered them to do so.
75
 
Moreover, Article 3 also contains another rule of attribution. Article 3 (3) envisages that 
under certain circumstances, EU Member States might also bear financial responsibility for the 
treatment afforded to an investor. These circumstances boil down to a single issue: EU Member 
States will bear financial responsibility if they want to. Therefore, the proposal does not make a 
clear choice between the EU’s sole responsibility andthe  joint responsibility of the EU and its 
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Member States. Instead, it leaves it to the EU and its Member States to decide who will bear the 
responsibility on a case by case basis.  
Furthermore, the proposed regulation enshrines a series of rules dealing with the EU’s 
participation in any investment dispute. Articles 8–21 provide different kinds of procedures 
which range from the procedure to follow for an EU Member State to act as respondents in the 
dispute (Article 8) to the procedure for the payment of the arbitral award (Article 16).  
The proposed regulation is a perfect example on the recent trend in the proceduralisation 
of the responsibility of the EU. On the one hand, it creates a legal vacuum in relation to 
responsibility. Even though the proposal lays down rules as to the allocation of responsibility, the 
proposal also allows the EU and its Member States to override these rules and modify the 
allocation of responsibility depending on the specific case. Thus, the Member States and the EU 
can leave the exact scope of the EU’s competence on FDI unsettled.76 On the other hand, the 
uncertainty that the variable responsibility would entail is diminished to a certain extent by the 
different procedures enshrined in the regulation. The regulation assumes that by laying down 
procedural rules on participation, the legal certainty of third parties is safeguarded. Transparency 
in how the decisions as to the participation of the EU and its Member States are taken should 
satisfy the concerns  of third parties. This is especially clear in Article 17, which provides for a 
procedure which would allow the third party to get its award even when there is no agreement 
between the EU and its Member States as to who bears the financial responsibility for this. In 
spite of this procedure, the legal certainty of other third parties is not completely safeguarded 
with these procedural strategies. Since each case can be approached in very different ways, 
depending on how the EU and its Member States decide to approach the dispute, third parties 
will have difficulties in trying to predict how their dispute will turn out.  
Overall, the proposed regulation is a mixture of pragmatism and proceduralisation aimed 
at safeguarding the legal certainty of third parties while at the same time taking into account the 
complexities underpinning the division of competences and the autonomy of EU law. However, 
would not a clear rule of attribution like the one contained in Article 3(1) of the proposed 
regulation have tackled the problems in a similar fashion while adding even more legal certainty? 
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The proposal shows how the EU is moving away from strict procedures based on the division of 
competences to more flexible procedures. Even though these new procedures take into account 
the division of competences from a practical perspective, this practical nature added to the 
flexibility in the participation of the EU Member States in disputes might create problems as 
regards the constitutional identity of the EU legal order. Given the exclusive nature of the FDI, 
how can a Member State incur responsibility if in principle it is not allowed to act in this area 
unless the EU has authorised it to do so?  
B. The EU’s Accession to the ECHR 
The EU’s accession to the ECHR will open a new era on the protection of fundamental rights in 
Europe. Furthermore, its accession poses plenty of challenges to both legal orders. Questions on 
the relations between the courts, the autonomous nature of the EU’s legal order or the impact of 
the ECtHR decisions on EU law are just some of the issues which are attracting scholarly 
attention.
77
 In addition, the issue of the responsibility within the ECtHR poses very interesting 
questions.
78
 In a similar vein to the proposed regulation in the field of FDI, the draft accession 
agreement
79
 and its explanatory report
80
 try to give an appearance of consensus between the 
different interests. Protocol 8 of the Lisbon Treaty already identified the different interests. It 
tackled the issue of the EU’s autonomy as well as legal certainty in Article 1, which provides 
that: 
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The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the ‘European 
Convention’) provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union shall make provision 
for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to: 
… (b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual 
applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate. 
The EU considers that insofar as its specific characteristics are preserved, the legal certainty of 
third parties would also be preserved. The protocol and, by extension, EU Member States are 
concerned that the mixed character of the ECHR can lead to the incorrect targeting of the EU or 
its Member States. The mechanism should give the subject bringing the claim the certainty that 
somebody will be held responsible for the violation of the ECHR. At the same time, it should 
also give EU Member States the certainty that they will not be held liable for acts which fall 
outside their competence. Furthermore, in order to to safeguard the autonomy of the EU Member 
States, the same protocol enshrines in its Article 2 that: ‘The agreement referred to in Article 1 
shall ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competences of the Union or the 
powers of its institutions.’ Therefore, the accession agreement should take all these different 
interests into account when drafting its responsibility rules.  
To deal with all these diverging concerns, the draft legal agreement on the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR establishes a new model of the proceduralisation of EU participation in 
international agreements. The draft agreement enshrines the so-called co-respondent mechanism 
which provides a procedure designed to allow the EU or its Member State to intervene so as to 
‘ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are correctly 
addressed to Member States and/or the Union’. In this regard, Article 36(4) ECHR as modified 
by the draft legal instrument provides that: 
The European Union or a Member State of the European Union may become a co-respondent to 
proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the Agreement on the 
Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application 
shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings. 
This provision enshrines a procedure by which the EU and its Member States will jointly 
participate in the proceedings brought against any of them. The aim of this procedure, as already 
mentioned, is to balance between the sui generis nature of the EU and the legal certainty of the 
other parties to the proceedings. As the explanatory report shows, the co-respondent mechanism 
is ‘a way to avoid gaps in participation, accountability and enforceability in the Convention 
system’. In other words, the mixed participation of the EU and its Member States summed up 
with the complex nature of the EU’s legal system y could create to gaps in terms of 
responsibility, which in this context means gaps in the protection of fundamental rights in 
Europe. Consequently, the co-respondent mechanism establishes that the EU or its Member 
States will take part in the proceedings whenever the compatibility between an EU law 
instrument and a provision of the ECHR is called into question.
81
 Moreover, though the article 
does not establish any rule on attribution or responsibility, it appears that the responsibility of the 
EU and its Member States will be joint in this respect.
82
  
The co-respondent mechanism establishes two different procedures depending on 
whether the breach stems from an EU primary norm or from a secondary norm. The rationale 
behind the co-respondent is to lay down a procedure to involve those ECHR contracting parties 
that are necessary to put an end to the human rights violation. By allowing the EU and/or its 
Member States to act as co-respondents, the draft agreement tries to ensure, as was pointed out 
above, that there will not be gaps in responsibility. However, a closer look at the co-responding 
mechanism will show that certain gaps in accountability will still remain after the EU’s accession 
to the ECHR. The main criticisms are aimed towards the voluntary nature of the co-respondent 
mechanism. Like Article 3(2) of the proposed regulation in the field of FDI, Article 3(2) and 3(3) 
of the draft agreement is worded in such a way that the procedure dealing with the EU’s 
responsibility does not establish a clear obligation on the EU and its Member States to intervene. 
Instead, both provisions provide that the ‘the European Union Member States may become co-
respondents’ as regards violations of the ECHR stemming from an EU primary rule and that ‘the 
European Union may become a co-respondent’ as regards violations stemming from EU 
secondary legislation. The wording of all these provisions gives the idea that the EU and its 
Member States have the last word as to becoming co-respondents. Regardless of whether they 
actually bear responsibility over the violation, the EU and/or its Member States can avoid being 
held responsible by simply not joining the proceedings. This is confirmed by the explanatory 
report, which clearly states that:  
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No High Contracting Party may be compelled against its will to become a co-respondent. This 
reflects the fact that the initial application was not addressed against the potential co-respondent, 
and that no High Contracting Party can be forced to become a party to a case where it was not 
named in the original application.
83
 
While this might be seen as a pragmatic solution designed to postpone and contextualise any 
decision regarding the division of competences, the voluntary nature of the co-respondent 
mechanism might be seen as problematic in terms of the effective protection of human rights in 
Europe. Regardless of the fact that it preserves the autonomy of the EU’s legal order,84 the 
voluntary nature can potentially create uncertainty as to who is going to intervene in the 
proceedings. Allowing the EU and its Member States to decide whether to join a specific case 
can create inconsistencies as regards their expected intervention. They might decide that in a 
specific case it is better not to intervene, whereas in another case with very similar facts, they 
might decide the contrary and join the proceedings as co-respondents. Inasmuch as the co-
respondent mechanism allows the EU and its Member States to decide whether or not to join 
proceedings against the other, that decision would always have to be approached as an ad hoc 
decision which cannot be generalized. This case by case approach to the issue of responsibility 
could create  uncertainty as to whether in similar situations the application ofthe co-respondent 
mechanism would have been the same.  
IV. Conclusions 
To deal with different interests, the EU in its treaty-making practice has included different kinds 
of mechanisms. The creation of legal vacuums (eg, mixed agreements) or proceduralisation of 
the participation and responsibility within international agreements are just some general 
examples of this trend. Nevertheless, these mediating strategies provide a simulacrum of 
consensus. The different interests do not meet; instead, through ad hoc solutions and procedures, 
the strategies favour certain interests over others in specific situations. Therefore, any solution to 
the conflict between the different interests or principles will be contextualised, meaning that the 
solution would be an ad hoc solution which might not be extrapolated to similar situations.  
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Moreover, this chapter has shown how through a detailed analysis of the two new 
mediating strategies, the tension between the different interests remains, and in some cases these 
techniques do not create a consensus between the different principles. By examining the 
proposed regulation on financial responsibility and the co-respondent mechanism in the draft 
agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR, the chapter has aimed to highlight two issues 
concerning the EU’s managerial approach towards its international responsibility. First, by 
examining two of the most recent examples on the EU’s organising techniques, the chapter has 
identified how these arrangements have become more complex over the years. Both proposals try 
to identify any possible scenario in which the EU’s responsibility may arise and lay down 
different procedures which in those situations will allow the different interests to coexist. 
Furthermore, it also shows how beyond the procedures, there is some room for manoeuvre. Both 
proposals take into account when establishing responsibility whether the EU and its Member 
States may want to bear the responsibility. Second, the complexity of these procedures combined 
with the voluntary element enshrined in it has the potential to undermine legal certainty. For 
instance, the EU may not decide to intervene in a case in the ECtHR and may then intervene in a 
similar one afterwards. Nothing in the procedure makes the EU’s intervention compulsory. 
Given the complexities surrounding the different organising techniques, it is submitted 
that the EU should try to advance other ways of managing its international responsibility. The 
inclusion of specific responsibility rules would not only give legal certainty to third parties but 
also would settle to a certain extent some of the conflicts between the EU and its Member States. 
In this regard, it is advanced that a similar rule to that enshrined in Article 3(1) of the proposed 
regulation on financial responsibility
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 would serve this purpose in an effective way. By 
establishing the EU’s responsibility when its organs have acted and when its Member States have 
acted by implementing EU law, the EU question of the division of competences and the 
autonomy of the EU should be settled. Since the EU could act and it did so, it should also bear 
the responsibility. Whereas in other areas of the life-cycle of an international agreement it is 
possible to leave the question of the division of competences unresolved (eg, the conclusion of 
the agreement), when speaking about responsibility, it is much more difficult, if not impossible. 
Given that someone must have committed a wrongful act for the responsibility to arise and that 
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the EU can only act if it has powers conferred upon it, any issue of responsibility for actions 
committed by EU Member States when implementing EU law must logically entail the 
responsibility of the EU. Moreover, having a clear responsibility rule based on the EU’s actions 
would not only safeguard the autonomy of the EU and its Member States but would also increase 
the legal certainty of third parties. A clear rule which would apply in the same manner in all 
scenarios provides much more legal certainty than any procedure.  
 
